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Given the considerable negativity of the Church’s doctrines, policies, and imageries and the
lack of pre-1000 Jewish population in western Christendom, the obvious question is how a
burgeoning European Jewish population developed in the period between 1000 and 1500. The
answer lies in the fact that some—but by no means all—elements in European society were
interested in fostering Jewish presence and that the Jews themselves were attracted to dynamically
developing western Christendom. The most important of the majority elements committed to
bringing Jews to western Christendom were the secular rulers of Europe, who saw in the Jews a
valuable resource and potentially useful allies. The positive perspectives of the ruling class were
not shared by other important sectors in society and were always mitigated by the complex
doctrines and policies of the Roman Catholic Church and the deteriorating popular imagery of
Judaism and Jews. Nonetheless, the interest of the rulers of Europe in the Jews and their power to
create positive conditions for Jewish life constituted the key—from the majority side—to evolving
Jewish circumstances in medieval western Christendom.
The Roman Catholic Church was concerned with the spiritual well-being of medieval
western Christendom and was very much constrained by pre-existent doctrines and policies. The
secular authorities of Europe were focused on the material circumstances of their realms and their
own immediate interests; they were relatively unfettered by pre-existent doctrines and policies.
This is not to say that there were no prior realities that impinged on these rulers. While the Church,
by virtue of its focus on the spiritual, could be oblivious to the mundane differences that
distinguished the various sectors of a highly heterogeneous European continent, the secular
authorities were deeply affected by these differences. For comprehending the alternative fates of
the diverse Jewish communities of medieval western Christendom, the regional differences that
divided the various geographic areas of Europe must be fully recognized.
The fault lines in medieval Europe were both horizontal and vertical. Perhaps the most
significant fault line lay in the distinction between the Mediterranean lands of southern Europe and
the more remote lands of the north. The Mediterranean lands of the south had been fully absorbed
into the Roman Empire and had been richly infused with Roman civilization and culture. Remnants
of Roman civilization and culture were (and are) everywhere palpable across the southern tier of
Europe; in contrast, the lands of northern Europe had been only brushed by contact with Rome and
had preserved much of their Germanic heritage. In a general way, the southern sector of medieval
western Christendom was far more advanced in the year 1000 than were the areas of the north.
That
situation, however, was to change rapidly and dramatically.
By virtue of its inclusion in the Roman world, the southern sectors of Europe had long been
populated by Jews. Jewish communities were to be found all across the northern shores of the
Mediterranean Sea. To be sure, the largest of these communities in the year 1000 were to be found
in those areas of Europe that were under Muslim control, specifically the southern sectors of the
Italian and Iberian peninsulas. As noted, the only Christian areas that harbored small Jewish
enclaves were the central and northern regions of the Italian peninsula, southern France, and the
northern regions of the Iberian peninsula. The reality of Jewish presence in some areas of Christian
Europe in the year 1000 and the more imposing reality of sizeable Jewish communities in areas that
would be conquered by Christian warriors beginning in the eleventh century created the backdrop to
the growth of European Jewry in the southern tiers of the continent.
The remarkable vitalization of western Christendom subsequent to the year 1000 took place
most markedly in the heretofore backward north. By the year 1500, England and France had
emerged as large and powerful monarchies on the Western scene, contesting the kingdoms of Spain
for preeminence. Indeed, part of the French monarchy’s success lay in its absorption of previously
independent southern territories into the expanded royal domain, centered in the north. Paris and
London were the greatest cities of medieval western Christendom by the year 1500; strikingly, they
had both been backward provincial towns five hundred years earlier. There is perhaps no more
eloquent testimony to the centrality of northern Europe in the great awakening of medieval western
Christendom that took place between 1000 and 1500.
Prior to the year 1000—unlike the situation in southern Europe—there were no old and
well-established Jewish communities in northern Europe. Jews had traveled across and traded in
the reaches of northern Europe, but had not chosen to settle there. The vitalization of these
heretofore backward areas and the encouragement offered by its rulers stimulated Jewish
immigration. Jews moved northward in increasingly large numbers and founded important and
creative Jewish settlements. Not surprisingly, these Jews were regularly seen as dissidents—the
only legitimate non-Christians in the area—and as newcomers, with all the resistances that
dissidents and newcomers normally elicit.
There was a second major fault line as well, one that proceeds on a vertical axis, and that is
the distinction—particularly noteworthy in the north—between western Europe, on the one hand,
and central and eastern Europe on the other. In the year 1000, the most potent political authority in
western Christendom seemed to be the German emperor. Rooted in imperial lore and tradition, the
German throne seemed likely to remain the strongest political power among the emerging states of
western Christendom. Such was not, however, to be the case. The far less imposing kings of
France, England, and Iberia learned how to manipulate the feudal system to their advantage, slowly
converting local rule and royal prerogative into large, stable, and increasingly puissant monarchies.
Germany slipped behind its more westerly neighbors in economic development, political maturity,
and cultural creativity. Further east, at the fringe of medieval western Christendom, such late-
blooming kingdoms as Hungary and Poland slowly began to develop toward the end of our period.
Finally, there is yet one more important geographic distinction, involving interior areas of
western Christendom and those exposed to outside forces. On many levels, differences emerged
between those lands generally insulated from outside aggression and with a relatively homogenous
population (in which Jews were prominent as the only legitimate dissenters), on the one hand, and
territories that bordered on other realms and in which populations were heterogeneous on the other.
The lands of the east—Italy in the south and Hungary and Poland in the north—were very much
exposed to external intrusion, as was the Iberian peninsula in the southwest. There were salient
differences between exposed and interior areas in terms of majority self-image and in terms of the
populations with which the Christian majority (even in a few instances the Christian ruling
minority) had to deal.
We must remain fully aware of these geographic distinctions. They played a key role in the
developments of well-rooted of Jewish life in the south, the establishment of important new Jewish
communities in the rapidly developing north,the banishment of these new Jewish centers to the
eastern peripheries of northern Europe toward the end of our period, and the eventual disappearance
of almost all Jewish life from the more advanced western sectors of Europe by the year 1500.
While it is convenient to talk of the Jewry of medieval western Christendom, it is vital to keep
firmly in mind that in fact we must think of the Jewries of medieval western Christendom, a set of
Jewish communities whose circumstances and fates differed markedly from one another.
The secular authorities were deeply concerned with economic issues, with improvement of
the material circumstances of their realms; their approach to the Jews and the issues they presented
was very much conditioned by this focus. The concentration of Jewish population in the Islamic
world and to a lesser extent in the Byzantine Empire made the Jews attractive as potential
conveyors of the material achievements of these more developed areas into a western Christendom
struggling to challenge its more advanced competitors. The Jews as agents of material maturation is
a theme recurrently encountered in the history of the various Jewish communities of medieval
western Christendom.
In southern Europe, this special Jewish role took one form; in the north, it took a somewhat
different tack. In the former case, especially in Sicily and Spain, Jews had become well integrated
into Muslim societies. As rapidly maturing Christian military strength translated into conquest, the
conquerors were faced withthe problem of maintaining the level of achievement of the areas they
were in the process of absorbing. Particularly urgent was maintenance of urban economy and
culture. For the Christian conquerors, the well-integrated Jews were especially useful. The Jews
had not been displaced from ruling authority and harbored no dreams of rebellion against the new
rulers and return to the status quo ante. For the Jews of the newly conquered areas of southern
Europe, the overriding issue was treatment. Favorable treatment would make them loyal adherents
of the new order and the conquering Christian rulers.
From Spain during the central period of the reconquest of the peninsula, we have numerous
charters addressed to the Jews of newly absorbed areas. These Jews were reassured as to their
physical safety, were promised extensive commercial and industrial privileges, were often accorded
tax advantages, and were sometimes given valuable land on which to build their public facilities and
private homes. The desire of the conquering Christian rulers to win over these valued allies and to
utilize their economic skills is palpable. Clearly, this positive view of the Jews was not necessarily
shared by all elements in Christian society; it was, however, dominant among the rulers and was
critical to the Jews.
The dynamic in the north was somewhat different. There, the circumstances did not involve
conquest and a pre-existent Jewish community. In northern Europe—an area lagging in all respects,
the critical issue was rapid development of the economy, in a way that would eventuate into
military, political, and cultural power. As noted, the development of northern-European society and
civilization was even more rapid than that of the south, transforming a backward area into a
dominant sector of the West. For the rulers of northern Europe, most of them rather modest in the
extent of their power during the eleventh and twelfth centuries, Jewish immigrants offered—first
and foremost—the potential for economic stimulation and growth. Jews were perceived as useful in
bringing the business expertise of more sophisticated areas into backward northern Europe.
We have a number of fleeting reflections of this positive perspective on the part of northern-
European rulers. The fullest and most revealing of these sources comes from the founding of the
Jewish community of Speyer in 1084. Happily, we have both the founding document itself and a
later Jewish reflection on the process. The bishop of Speyer, in his charter of 1084, indicates
clearly that economic advancement of his town lay at the root of his decision to invite Jews: “When
I wished to make a town out of the village of Speyer, I, Rudiger, surnamed Huozmann, bishop of
Speyer, thought that the glory of our town would be augmented a thousand-fold if I were to bring
Jews.” Clearly, the contribution anticipated from these Jewish settlers was economic.
Bishop Rudiger proceeds to indicate the mechanism for attracting Jewish settlers. After
detailing a number of boons conferred on these Jews—areas of the town designated for Jewish
settlement, a wall to protect them from hostile burghers, land for a cemetery, trade rights, judicial
autonomy, freedom from certain ecclesiastical infringements, he concludes: “In short, in order to
achieve the heights of kindness, I have granted them a legal status more generous than any the
Jewish people have in any city of the German kingdom.” Jews could be attracted by the terms
offered them to settle. Bishop Rudiger ends his charter of invitation by providing signed and sealed
authentication of the document as permanent testimony to the status of the Jewish community of
Speyer. While a useful ending to the document from the Jewish point of view, such authentication
could of course by no means guarantee positive treatment over the succeeding decades and
centuries, as conditions might change and in fact did.
What more precisely were the economic benefits that Jews were expected to confer? Again,
the situations in southern and northern areas differed. In the south, where Jewish settlement was
well established and Jews were fairly well integrated into the economy, the anticipated Jewish
contribution was diversified. In those areas in the process of conquest, the new Christian rulers
hoped that Jews would stay and assist in maintenance of the prior economic order. A loyal and
effective urban population in the newly conquered areas was key to further Christian successes. In
the north, maintenance of a status quo ante was not the issue; rapid economic development was the
major objective. In these lagging northern areas, the Jews were expected above all else to
contribute their mercantile expertise. The charter of Bishop Rudiger of Speyer and similar late-
eleventh- and twelfth-century charters highlight trade rights, suggesting that the Jewish immigrants
were concentrated in buying and selling.
During the twelfth century, new circumstances and needs in western Christendom produced
new economic opportunities for its Jews and further incentives for governmental support of these
Jews. The twelfth century saw an accelerating pattern of economic development, on the one hand,
and an increasingly powerful Church demanding religious reforms on the other. Among the major
targets of reforming ardor was the sin of Christian usury, of Christians taking interest on loans to
other Christians. Given the combination of economic pressure for flow of capital created by the
rapid maturation of western Christendom and the Church’s countervailing efforts to eradicate
Christian usury, a new avenue of economic opportunity was created for Europe’s Jews. Since they
were not bound by the prohibition of taking interest from Christians and since they were already
heavily involved in business—especially in the north, Jews could move fairly quickly to fill an
economic vacuum, and they in fact did so, again with the support of many of the political authorities
of western Christendom.
If we compare the charter of Bishop Rudiger of Speyer to the influential charter given by
Duke Frederick of Austria to his Jews in 1244, we can sense dramatically how thoroughly Jewish
economic activity had shifted in the intervening century and a half. In 1084, the only clause that
dealt with Jewish economic rights guaranteed the Jews of Speyer “the right of exchanging gold and
silver and of buying and selling everything they use.” In striking contrast, the charter of 1244,
which included thirty beneficial stipulations for the Jews of Austria, devoted fully ten of these
stipulations to Jewish economic rights. Each of these ten stipulations addressed one or another
aspect of Jewish money-lending. There can be little doubt that the economic backbone of the
thirteenth-century Jews of Austria—and the Jews of Poland and Hungary whose charters were
based on the Austrian model—was money-lending.
Jewish money-lending developed in two basic directions—the simpler and less lucrative
pawn-broking reflected in the Austrian, Polish, and Hungarian charters and the more sophisticated
government-backed lending that reached its zenith in twelfth- and thirteenth-century England and
France. Pawn-broking represents a relatively primitive form of guaranteeing the return of the loan
disbursed. The borrower leaves a pledge of value equal to or more than the obligation undertaken
to the lender. Should the borrower subsequently default, the lender is already in possession of
goods of equal or greater value. While this simple form of money-lending requires little
governmental assistance, the Austrian, Polish, and Hungarian charters indicate that there were many
complex issues that could emerge and in which the authorities could be most helpful to their Jewish
money-lending subjects.
The more sophisticated and lucrative form of money-lending involved the extension of
funds against land as collateral, which Jews could not of course take into their direct possession at
the time of the loan. This kind of money-lending involved much larger sums and much higher
profits; it could only take place, however, with the backing of powerful and effective governments.
In case of default, it was the ruling authorities that would insure Jewish possession of the land put
up as collateral. These larger and more lucrative loans thus deepened the bonds already cited
between the Jews and their overlords. Now, in addition to providing requisite security, the
authorities constituted the backbone of Jewish business as well.
The more sophisticated forms of money-lending that first developed in England and France
required accurate record keeping and governments with the power to enforce obligations. Accurate
governmental record keeping emerged first in England, then spread to France and subsequently the
Spanish kingdoms. By the early thirteenth-century, loan documents in England were being written
in three copies, with one going to the lender, one to the borrower, and the third deposited in a royal
chest for safekeeping. The English monarchy and the French as well were by and large assiduous in
enforcing the obligations increasingly well documented. As we shall see shortly, the full records
proved to be a mixed blessing. On the one hand, they protected the money disbursed by the Jewish
lenders; at the same time, they provided the authorities with extensive information on Jewish
wealth, useful at points of heavy taxation.
Jewish money-lending provided a new form of economic grounding for the Jews first of
northern Europe and subsequently of all of western Christendom. At the same time, it harbored a
number of potential dangers, most of which in fact materialized. In the first place, excessive
concentration in any sector of the economy is always precarious for individuals or communities.
Jewish economic activity heavily grounded in money-lending always meant that, if—for one reason
or another—that economic grounding were weakened, Jews would be highly vulnerable. In
addition, money-lending and banking more generally have never generated popular approbation.
Normally, borrowers are deeply appreciative at the time of the loan, but feel much differently at the
time of repayment. Given the ecclesiastical condemnation of Christian usury, all usury was tainted
with the odor of sinfulness, even if Jewish money-lending was ecclesiastically sanctioned.
In fact, with the passage of time, Church leadership became concerned with the new
economic avenue it had opened for Jews. By the early thirteenth century, the Church was heavily
involved in efforts to protect Christian society from what it perceived as evils associated with
Jewish money-lending. The most famous initiative in that direction was the canon of the Fourth
Lateran Council of 1215 prohibiting excessive rates of interest on Jewish loans. With the passage
of time, many ecclesiastical leaders rethought the permissibility of Jewish lending at interest. While
prohibition of Jewish usury altogether remained a minority view within the Church, it did enhance
governmental and popular negativity to Jewish lending.
Finally, Jewish money-lending of the more sophisticated variety deepened the relationship
between the Jews and their overlords in unhealthy ways. The secular authorities of western
Christendom had fairly full information on Jewish business and wealth and could exploit that
wealth rather effectively.
Money-lending contributed positively to the economic development of western Christendom
during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It also enabled the Jews of western Christendom to
support themselves; it in fact enabled a small number of Jews to achieve great wealth. Money-
lending was, however, hardly an unmixed blessing; it entailed a number of significant liabilities.
The rulers of western Christendom—in a number of different ways—saw in the Jews a
valuable element in their incessant struggle for development of their realms. Jews were perceived
as urban dwellers who might stimulate the economy of the areas in which they settled. To be sure,
there was an additional and more immediate advantage that the Jews provided. The rulers of
northern Europe were constrained by a conservative system of taxation, which allowed little leeway
for tax innovation. As northern-European principalities matured, ever larger sums of money were
required to pursue increasingly ambitious military and peaceful plans. The conservative tax
system—essentially a system grounded in custom—served as a major constraint. New ways to
access the burgeoning wealth of rapidly developing principalities were required, and the Jews
provided precisely such access. The safeguards offered by appeal to traditional taxation were
hardly available to the Jews. Since they were so deeply dependent on the secular authorities for
basic protection and—with the passage of time—for business support as well, Jews were hardly in a
position to withstand governmental demands for increased taxes.
While there is no reliable way of ascertaining the level of Jewish contribution to
governmental coffers during the Middle Ages, there is nonetheless broad consensus as to the reality
of significant Jewish contribution to governmental income, especially in the more sophisticated
principalities and monarchies of the western sectors of Europe. Indeed, there was always the danger
of exploiting Jewish wealth to the point of destroying Jewish business capacity. Robert Stacey has
documented this danger in England of the 1240’s, arguing that the heavy taxation levied by King
Henry III in fact destroyed the economic base of English Jewry.
We have seen in prior sections that ecclesiastical policy toward the Jews of western
Christendom and popular perceptions of these Jews deteriorated during the late twelfth and
thirteenth centuries. Not surprisingly, the same is true for the posture of the governing authorities
as well. The key protectors of Jewish interests turned increasingly negative, again especially in the
most advanced, westerly areas of northern Europe. The factors influencing the diminution of
governmental support—indeed in many cases the fostering of governmental hostility—were many
and diverse.
The new and more limiting stance of the Church certainly played a role. Especially the
ecclesiastical assault on Jewish money-lending posed serious threats to governmental support for
this mainstay of Jewish economic activity. The legislation of the Capetian kings of France during
the first half of the thirteenth century shows a pattern of steady withdrawal of governmental support
for the officially sanctioned and supported money-lending, which had for nearly a century
stimulated the French economy and enriched some of the French Jews. By the middle of the
thirteenth century, the pious Louis IX, who had absorbed the extreme ecclesiastical position that
denied the Jewish right to take interest altogether, ordered his Jews to desist from usury or to leave
his realm. The impact of the new and more limiting stance of the Church can be discerned on King
Edward I of England as well.
At the same time, the accelerating popular hostility toward the Jews—grounded in
traditional Church imagery but exacerbated by the newness of the Jews in northern Europe, by their
pioneering economic activities, by their close alliance with the secular authorities, by the
competitive envy of the rising urban class, and by the high level of anxiety in western Christendom
generally—took a toll as well. Medieval monarchs and barons were hardly democratic in their
thinking and behavior; nonetheless, the will of the populace could not be totally dismissed.
Minimally, anti-Jewish actions taken by rulers might well be greeted by popular approbation, and
many rulers were well aware of this opportunity to curry popular favor.
Governmental actions harmful to Jewish interests took a number of different forms. The
first was acceptance of the increasingly injurious dictates of the Church. As noted, the mid-
thirteenth century Capetian monarchy of France was especially accepting of the new ecclesiastical
demands for limitation of Jewish money-lending. Throughout western Christendom, the innovative
ecclesiastical insistence on Jews wearing identifying garb—initially resisted by many of the rulers
of western Christendom—began to be enforced by a growing number of rulers. In addition, the
Church’s new campaign to win over Jews through forced sermons and disputations also found
increasing governmental backing.
A second thrust of governmental activity deleterious to the Jews was enhanced taxation. As
noted, the rulers of western Christendom—always under financial pressure and strain—saw in the
Jews ready access to funds otherwise closed to them. Good sense dictated measured taxation,
which would maximize profit while enabling the Jews to maintain their business activities,
grounded in the give-and-take of capital. Unduly heavy taxation ran the risk of destroying the
foundations of Jewish economic activity. However, good sense did not always win out. Chafing
under heavy burdens and aware of popular resentment of the Jews, some rulers opted to tax beyond
reason. Ready access to money-lending records fueled this kind of cupidity. In both England and
France, recurrent heavy taxation of the Jews weakened the Jewish communities to the point where
they could no longer produce the revenues they once had.
On occasion, rulers could be affected by the deteriorating imagery of the Jews, accepting
anti-Jewish allegations judicially or—in rare cases-even assaulting Jewish communities in support
of popular grievance. Thus, for example, in a fairly well-documented incident, The important
Count Theobald of Blois upheld the claim of Jewish malicious murder of a Christian youngster—
even in the face of lack of a cadaver. This move was, to be sure, repudiated energetically by
Theobald’s overlord, King Louis VII of France, but it was an injurious precedent. Curiously, King
Louis’s own son, King Philip Augustus, attacked a Jewish community in a neighboring barony in
support of the claim that the Jews of that town had been responsible for the death of Christian there.
The final step that might be taken by governmental authorities was banishment of the Jews
entirely from given domains. It will be recalled that the Church took the position that Jewish
presence was legitimate in Christian society. When individual Jews broke the laws—religious or
secular—that constrained them, they were of course subject to the courts and to appropriate
punishment. When the Jewish community as a whole seemed to be guilty of major offenses, then
expulsion of such Jewish communities was deemed permissible. In the spate of significant
expulsions that began to afflict European Jewry toward the end of the thirteenth century and
continued to the end of our period, rulers who chose to banish their Jews always grounded their
edicts of banishment in some alleged misdeeds of the Jews that could not be corrected except
thorough removal of the offending Jews. During the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, the
purportedly incorrigible Jewish behavior revolved around money-lending. The unwillingness of the
Jews to abandon their nefarious money-lending was the supposed reason for the decision to remove
them. While there were often other more mundane factors at work as well, such as the desire for
revenue or the need to placate one or another element in society, every expulsion had to be
grounded in Jewish misdeed. The final expulsions of our period, from the Spanish kingdoms in
1492 and from Portugal in 1497, were portrayed as the result of the deleterious Jewish impact on
the large number of New Christians on the Iberian peninsula. So long as Jews remained—it was
claimed—the grievous problem of backsliding into Judaism on the part of these New Christians
could not be solved.
Local expulsions began in northern France in the later twelfth century. Toward the end of
the thirteenth century, the new tendency accelerated. In 1290, Jews were expelled from England,
and in 1306 the same fate befell the Jews of royal France. Expulsion became a feature of Jewish
life throughout western Christendom during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, with Jews
expelled recurrently from diverse domains. In some instances, these Jews were recalled; in other
instances the banishment became permanent. The culminating expulsions of our period took place
on the Iberian peninsula in 1492 and 1497. The Jewish communities expelled at this point were
among the very oldest in western Christendom and were deemed by many immune from expulsion.
That even these oldest of European Jewish communities might be banished reflected the extent to
which the new and negative governmental stance became the norm, at least in the most westerly and
advanced areas of western Christendom.
Enhanced Jewish settlement in western Christendom, begun so promisingly at the turn of the
millennium, seemed to end on a distinctly negative note. The secular authorities—the major
sponsors of Jewish presence in Europe—had turned their backs on the Jews whom they had earlier
cultivated so assiduously. Over the five centuries between 1000 and 1500, however, the support of
the authorities had resulted in the strengthening of old Jewish communities and the establishment of
new Jewish settlements. The Jews of western Christendom—with the encouragement of the secular
authorities—had enriched the areas in which they settled, had created new centers of Jewish life,
and had embellished the legacy bequeathed by their predecessors. In the process, they had laid the
foundations for modern Jewish life in the Christian West.